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THE POTENTIAL FOR STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL TO 
PROMOTE THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND 
PRACTICE 
LAINIE RUTKOW* AND STEPHEN P. TERET** 
The Attorneys General of the 50 states have considerable legal authority to 
protect the public’s health, yet their role in the development of health policy is 
often under-appreciated or misunderstood.  This article analyzes state 
Attorneys’ General current powers and provides a logic model that illustrates 
how the use of these powers can lead to the protection and promotion of the 
public’s health.  The article then provides four brief case studies to 
demonstrate how state Attorneys General have used their varied powers to 
influence policy-making and benefit the public’s health.  In addition, this 
article offers a roadmap for research that could be conducted to better 
understand the association between state Attorneys’ General actions and the 
protection of the public’s health.  The article concludes with a series of 
recommendations intended to enhance state Attorneys’ General ability to 
protect the public’s health, along with suggestions for future research in this 
area. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION1 
In the United States, the chief legal officer of each state is known as the 
Attorney General.2  State Attorneys General (SAGs) can take a wide range of 
actions on behalf of their state and the public interest through law enforcement, 
litigation, investigatory activities, and law and policy reform work. 
Forty-three states elect their SAG by popular vote.3  In five states, the SAG 
is appointed by the governor.4  Maine’s SAG is elected by a vote among the 
state’s legislature,5 and Tennessee’s SAG is appointed by the state’s Supreme 
Court.6  Requirements for SAGs’ age, in-state residency, bar licensure, and 
term lengths vary among the states.7  All SAGs belong to the National 
Association of Attorneys General (NAAG), which facilitates cooperation 
among the SAGs through meetings, training opportunities, and projects.8 
SAGs have broad powers that allow them to protect and promote the 
public’s health.9  In recent years SAGs have successfully tackled numerous 
public health issues, including end-of-life care, alcohol policy, tobacco control, 
prescription drug abuse, Medicaid fraud, and hospital mergers.10  This list is 
 
 1. The research associated with this article was funded by Public Health Law Research, a 
national program of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.  The authors would like to thank 
Hugh Carlson for his research assistance.  While this article was being drafted, the authors spoke 
with several individuals who provided useful feedback.  The authors would like to thank: Kelly 
Brownell of the Rudd Center for Food Policy and Obesity at Yale University; Abbe Gluck of 
Columbia Law School; Cindy Lott of the National State Attorneys General Program at Columbia 
Law School; Jennifer Pomeranz of the Rudd Center for Food Policy and Obesity at Yale 
University; Jim Tierney of the National State Attorneys General Program at Columbia Law 
School; and Marlene Trestman of the Maryland Office of the Attorney General.  Finally, the 
authors would like to thank reviewers within the Public Health Law Research Program for helpful 
insights and comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
 2. In addition, the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana 
Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands each have their own Attorney General.  Current 
Attorneys General, NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., http://www.naag.org/current-attorneys-
general.php (last visited Apr. 18, 2011). 
 3. About NAAG: The Attorneys General, NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., 
http://www.naag.org/about_naag.php (last visited Apr. 18, 2011). 
 4. The five states in which the governor appoints the SAG are Alaska, Hawaii, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, and Wyoming.  Id. 
 5. About Attorney General William J. Schneider, OFF. OF THE ME. ATT’Y GEN., 
http://www.maine.gov/ag/about/message.shtml (last visited Apr. 18, 2011). 
 6. Attorney General Robert E. Cooper, Jr., OFF. OF THE TENN. ATT’Y GEN. & REP., 
http://www.tennessee.gov/attorneygeneral/agcooperbio.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2011). 
 7. NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL POWERS AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES 20–23 (Emily Myers & Lynne Ross eds., 2007) [hereinafter POWERS AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES]. 
 8. About NAAG, supra note 3. 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. NAAG Projects, NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., http://www.naag.org/projects.php 
(last visited Apr. 18, 2011). 
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not exhaustive and this article will not attempt to cover all the ways in which 
SAGs can promote the public’s health; rather, it will provide selected examples 
of SAGs’ use of different powers to address public health issues both within 
their own states and, through collaboration, across jurisdictions. 
While SAGs have considerable legal authority to protect the public’s 
health, this important subject has not yet been fully explored.  This article 
begins with a discussion of SAGs’ powers and an explanation of how these 
powers can be used to protect the public’s health.  It then offers four 
examples—tobacco control, firearms regulation, food labeling practices, and 
pharmaceutical marketing—to demonstrate how SAGs have used their powers 
to benefit the public’s health.  The article then summarizes the limited, 
empirical work examining the promotion of the public’s health by SAGs.  In 
light of these findings, the article offers an analysis of future actions SAGs can 
take to promote the public’s health.  It concludes with a set of 
recommendations intended to enhance SAGs’ abilities in this area, along with 
suggestions for future research. 
II.  LOGIC MODEL OF THE ABILITY OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL TO 
PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH 
State Attorneys General can draw upon diverse powers to protect and 
promote the health of their state’s population.  Even without identifying every 
aspect of public health available for protection, one can nevertheless classify 
SAGs’ broad powers and explore what mediating factors might enhance or 
detract from these powers to benefit the public’s health.  These classifications 
and findings result in a more nuanced understanding of how SAGs can use 
their powers to impact particular areas of public health. 
The relationship between SAGs’ powers and their ability to protect the 
public’s health is depicted in Figure 1.  As this logic model demonstrates, the 
path from an SAG’s initial grant of legal authority to the demonstrable 
protection of the public’s health involves important decision points, such as 
which power an SAG will use, and significant mediators, such as the tenor of 
the legal environment in which the SAG operates.  By exploring each path 
within Figure 1, a comprehensive description of an SAG’s ability to protect the 
public’s health can be achieved. 
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A. Grants of Authority 
The law grants SAGs the authority to use certain powers to carry out the 
requirements of their positions.  This initial grant of legal authority can be 
traced to three different sources: common law, state constitutions, and state 
statutes.  These powers are grounded in the common law, also known as judge-
made or case law.  NAAG has identified many SAG powers that are derived 
from the common law, including “the duty to appear for and defend the state 
and its agencies,” “the right to intervene in legal proceedings on behalf of the 
public interest,” and “the authority to prosecute criminal activity, in the 
absence of express legislative restriction.”11 
Many scholars recognize State ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corporation12 as the 
case that best articulates the development of these common law powers.13  This 
case originated in 1973, when Robert Shevin, Florida’s then Attorney General, 
brought an antitrust suit against several large oil companies in federal court.14  
The oil companies challenged Shevin’s authority to bring the suit since he had 
not explicitly received authorization from the state of Florida to do so.15  In its 
analysis of the Florida Attorney General’s powers, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals provided a detailed account of the origin of SAGs’ common law 
powers:16 
[SAGs’] duties and powers typically are not exhaustively defined by either 
constitution or statute but include all those exercised at common law.  There is 
and has been no doubt that the legislature may deprive the attorney general of 
specific powers; but in the absence of such legislative action, he typically may 
exercise all such authority as the public interest requires.  And the attorney 
general has wide discretion in making the determination as to the public 
interest.17 
In light of this analysis, the Fifth Circuit concluded that as Florida’s SAG, 
Shevin had the power to bring the lawsuit in federal court on behalf of Florida 
without receiving prior authorization from the state.18  Shevin has been 
 
 11. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 7, at 44–47. 
 12. Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1976). 
 13. Justin G. Davids, State Attorneys General and the Client-Attorney Relationship: 
Establishing the Power to Sue State Officers, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 365, 375–76 
(2005); Peter Romer-Friedman, Eliot Spitzer Meets Mother Jones: How State Attorneys General 
Can Enforce State Wage and Hour Laws, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 495, 508–09 (2006). 
 14. Florida ex rel. Shevin, 526 F.2d at 267–68. 
 15. Id. at 267–68. 
 16. Id. at 268–69. 
 17. Id. at 268–69. 
 18. Id. 
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repeatedly cited to clarify SAGs’ powers, with particular emphasis on SAGs’ 
“vast” and “wide discretion” to bring lawsuits to protect the public interest.19 
Some states have codified their SAG’s authority by explicitly mentioning 
the SAG’s common law powers in a statute or the state’s constitution.20  For 
example, according to Alabama’s state code, “[t]he attorney general shall have 
and retain all of the powers, duties, and authority heretofore granted or 
authorized by the constitution, statutory law, or the common law.”21  Most 
state constitutions contain similar language regarding the SAG’s grant of 
authority.22  A few states require the SAG to solely rely upon authority granted 
by state statute rather than the common law.23  For instance, in In re Sharp’s 
Estate, a case which challenged the Wisconsin SAG’s authority to intervene in 
a lawsuit, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin explained that “Wisconsin, unlike 
numerous states, has specifically circumscribed the powers and duties of the 
office of the Attorney General . . . to those ‘prescribed by law.’”24 
B. Litigation and Law Enforcement 
As the paths designated by the first number in Figure 1 demonstrate, an 
initial grant of authority under the common law, state statutes, or a state’s 
constitution allows an SAG to take certain well-established actions.25  These 
actions fall within three general categories: 1) litigation and law enforcement; 
2) investigative activities; and 3) law and policy reform.  Within each of these 
categories, SAGs can draw on a variety of powers to accomplish their aims. 
All states grant their SAG the power to participate in litigation on behalf of 
the state.  For example, New Jersey offers a typical codification of this power: 
“[The Attorney General] shall exclusively attend to and control all litigation 
and controversies to which the State is a party or in which its rights and 
interests are involved.”26  Due to the broad nature of SAGs’ litigation 
responsibilities, many SAGs create specialized groups within their offices to 
handle certain types of recurring litigation, such as consumer protection or 
 
 19. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mid-Atlantic Toyota Distributors, Inc., 704 F.2d 125, 132 n.15 
(4th Cir. 1983); Ohio v. United Transp., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 1278 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
 20. Amy Dieterich, The Role of the State Attorney General in Preventing and Punishing 
Hate Crimes Through Civil Prosecution: Positive Experiences and Possible First Amendment 
Potholes, 61 ME. L. REV. 521, 524 (2009). 
 21. ALA. CODE § 36-15-1 (LexisNexis 2010). 
 22. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 7, at 38. 
 23. In re Sharp’s Estate, 217 N.W.2d 258, 262 (Wis. 1974); 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorney General 
§ 7 (Supp. 2010). 
 24. In re Sharp’s Estate, 217 N.W.2d at 262. 
 25. Supra Figure 1. 
 26. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:17A-4 (West 2010). 
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environmental lawsuits.27  Because they control all litigation that involves the 
State, SAGs are similarly responsible for representing their state’s agencies 
when legal challenges arise.  Accordingly, New Jersey’s statute provides a 
representative example—it has codified the SAG’s responsibility to represent 
state agencies when they are sued and when an agency initiates a lawsuit to 
enforce the laws for which it is responsible.28 
Under their common law authority, SAGs have the power to use litigation 
as a tool to protect “the public interest”29 and will often rely on the doctrine of 
parens patriae (“parent of the country”) to do so.  Parens patriae authority 
allows an SAG to bring litigation to “recover costs or damages incurred 
because of behavior that threatens the health, safety, and welfare of the state’s 
citizenry.”30  SAGs have used their parens patriae power to bring lawsuits in 
diverse areas, such as securities and commodities and environmental law.31 
In addition to initiating and participating in civil litigation, SAGs play an 
important role in the enforcement of their state’s criminal law.  The scope of an 
SAG’s authority in this area varies significantly among the states.  In Rhode 
Island, the SAG has broad authority to prosecute criminal offenses, and is 
required to submit an annual report to the state’s governor detailing these 
activities.32  Connecticut’s Attorney General does not have the authority to 
supervise legal matters concerning criminal prosecutions; rather, he is the chief 
legal officer of the state for civil matters.33  In most states, however, the SAG’s 
criminal law enforcement authority falls between these two extremes.  Within 
this continuum, some states, such as Michigan, grant the SAG statutory 
authority to use the state police to assist “in any investigation or matter under 
the jurisdiction of his or her department.”34  Many SAGs with significant 
criminal law enforcement authority have even established criminal justice 
divisions within their offices.35  For example, the Texas Attorney General’s 
 
 27. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 7, at 83; Consumer Protection Division, 
MD. ATT’Y GEN., http://www.oag.state.md.us/consumer/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2011); 
Environmental Protection Division, OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN. OF VT., http://www.atg.state.vt.us/ 
issues/environmental-protection.php (last visited Apr. 18, 2011). 
 28. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:17A-4 (West 2010). 
 29. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 7, at 83; Victor E. Schwartz et al., Can 
Governments Impose a New Tort Duty to Prevent External Risks? The “No-Fault” Theories 
Behind Today’s High-Stakes Government Recoupment Suits, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 923, 928 
(2009). 
 30. Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco 
Litigation, and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859, 1863 (2000). 
 31. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 7, at 103. 
 32. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-9-2, 49-9-4, 49-9-12 (2007). 
 33. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-125 (2009). 
 34. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.6 (2008). 
 35. See, e.g., Preventing CRIME, DEL. ATT’Y GENERALS OFF., http://attorneygeneral.dela 
ware.gov/crime/crimeprevent.shtml (last visited Apr. 18, 2011); Wyoming Attorney General’s 
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Office contains five criminal law sections, including a criminal prosecutions 
division and a Medicaid fraud control unit.36 
C. Investigative Activities 
In Figure 1, paths designated by the number 2 indicate that SAGs’ 
investigative activities can contribute to their litigation and law enforcement 
efforts, as well as to their law and policy reform work.37  This is because, in 
civil and criminal contexts, SAGs can conduct investigations into issues such 
as “government misconduct . . . , criminal activity . . . , [and] issues of 
substantial public interest.”38  For criminal investigations, most states grant 
their Attorney General the ability to issue subpoenas to obtain testimony or 
evidence.39 
In some instances, an SAG will launch an investigation based on concerns 
raised by the citizens of his or her state.40  The results of these investigations, 
which are sometimes shared publicly through the issuance of reports, can 
provoke litigation or other advocacy efforts to address the perceived wrong.41  
However, the investigation’s findings may independently lead to change based 
on recommendations contained within the SAG’s report.42  For example, in 
2007, after Lyme disease advocacy groups approached Connecticut’s Attorney 
General to contest two medical associations’ guidelines recommending against 
long-term antibiotic treatment for Lyme disease, the SAG launched an 
investigation to learn more about the development of these guidelines.43  The 
investigation uncovered multiple conflicts of interest that may have prevented 
objectivity among those who drafted the guidelines.44  As a result of the 
investigation’s findings, the medical societies agreed to have their 2006 Lyme 
disease recommendations reviewed by a panel of independent experts.45 
 
Criminal Division, WYO. ATT’Y GEN., http://attorneygeneral.state.wy.us/crimpg.htm (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2011). 
 36. Criminal Justice Division, ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX., http://www.oag.state.tx.us/criminal/ 
criminal.shtml (last visited Apr. 17, 2011). 
 37. Supra Figure 1. 
 38. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 7, at 14. 
 39. Id. at 308. 
 40. See generally AG’s in the News, COLUM. L. SCH., http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_ 
program/ag/AGsintheNews (last visited Apr. 18, 2011). 
 41. Id. 
 42. E.g., Brenda Patoine, Guideline-Making Gets Tougher: Action by State Attorney General 
Over Lyme Disease Guidelines Stirs Debate, 65 ANNALS NEUROLOGY A10 (2009). 
 43. Id. 
 44. AG’s in the News, supra note 40. 
 45. Press Release, Office of the Conn. Attorney Gen., Attorney General’s Investigation 
Reveals Flawed Lyme Disease Guideline Process, IDSA Agrees to Reassess Guidelines, Install 
Independent Arbiter (May 1, 2008), available at http://www.ct.gov/AG/cwp/view.asp?a=2795&q 
=414284. 
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D. Law and Policy Reform 
Several of the most frequently used powers among SAGs fall within the 
category of law and policy reform.  As a state’s chief legal officer, an SAG is 
frequently called upon to provide advice to the governor and administrative 
agencies.46  This advice can pertain to any legal or policy issue.47  A related, 
but separate, power involves an SAG’s issuance of opinions.  Opinions are 
solicited from an SAG by the governor or a state agency, with the expectation 
that the SAG will provide a written response.48  For example, in 2008, 
Maryland’s Attorney General issued an opinion, in response to a request by the 
Comptroller of Maryland, to clarify whether Baltimore City could legally 
implement a proposed regulation to restrict the sale of cheap cigars.49  While 
opinions can be written in response to a broad range of inquiries, in general 
SAGs’ opinions should not address issues that are currently being litigated, 
hypothetical questions, or “issues unrelated to the requester’s duties . . . .”50 
While an SAG’s opinion is not legally binding, it should be “entitled to 
great weight” both by officers of the state and by the courts.51  SAGs can, 
however, promulgate legally binding regulations or rules, using authority 
granted to them by the state.52  For example, in Ohio, the Attorney General has 
been granted rule-making authority for “charitable law, consumer protection, 
crime victims services, criminal record checks, environmental background 
investigation, and peace officer training.”53 
In addition to utilizing their formal powers, SAGs can engage in advocacy 
to promote change.  Some SAGs do this by using the “bully pulpit” of their 
office to make their views known or to bring attention to a particular issue.54  
 
 46. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorney General § 9 (2007). 
 47. See The Attorney General Opinion Process, ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX., https://www.oag.state. 
tx.us/agency/weeklyag/weekly_columns_view.php?id=208 (last visited Apr. 19, 2011). 
 48. Lainie Rutkow & Stephen P. Teret, Role of State Attorneys General in Health Policy, 
304 JAMA 1377, 1377 (2010). 
 49. Whether Baltimore City Health Code Regulation Concerning Sales of Cheap Cigars Is 
Preempted by State Law, 93 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 149 (Md. 2008), available at http://www.oag.state. 
md.us/Opinions/2008/93oag149.pdf. 
 50. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 7, at 76. 
 51. Napa Valley Educators’ Ass’n v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 194 Cal. App. 3d 243, 
251 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987);  cf. In re Proposal C. v. Kelley, 185 N.W.2d 9, 17 n.2 (Mich. 1971) 
(“Although an opinion of the Attorney General is not a binding interpretation of law which courts 
must follow, it does command the allegiance of state agencies.”). 
 52. See The Attorney General Opinion Process, supra note 47. 
 53. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., STATE OF OHIO, RULE-MAKING PROCESS, available at 
http://www.registerofohio.state.oh.us/pdfs/rmg/RMG_109_20031117.pdf. 
 54. Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systemic Reforms, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 615, 
641–42 (2006); State Attorneys General, Nutrition, and Obesity, YALE RUDD CENTER FOR FOOD 
POLICY & OBESITY (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.yaleruddcenter.org/podcasts.aspx (search James 
E. Tierney under Guest). 
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This can be accomplished by issuing press releases, granting interviews, or 
holding press conferences.  An SAG can also raise awareness about a certain 
topic by using his or her ability to convene individuals.  For example, some 
SAGs host summits to bring together experts in consumer protection, with the 
goal of identifying and exploring areas in which SAGs could do a better job of 
protecting the public.55  Finally, SAGs can use their collective force to engage 
in advocacy that targets an industry or company.  In 2007, twenty-nine SAGs 
sent a letter to the Chief Executive Officer of Anheuser-Busch, “to express 
[their] serious concern about [the] company’s promotion and sale of alcoholic 
energy drinks . . . [which] are highly attractive to underage youth.”56  Several 
weeks later, Anheuser-Busch announced that it would stop making Spykes™, 
the alcoholic energy drink that the SAGs had targeted in their letter.57 
For SAGs to ensure that the public benefits from their work, they must 
take steps to share information about their offices’ efforts.58  To accomplish 
this, every SAG works with a public information officer.59  These individuals 
liaise with the media and share information, promoting the SAG’s advocacy 
efforts and providing brief summaries of the SAG’s accomplishments and how 
they have benefited the state’s citizens.60  Additionally, public information 
officers disseminate pamphlets, reports, or other materials that an SAG creates 
for the public.61  In doing so, they promote a dynamic relationship between the 
SAG’s office and the individuals the SAG serves. 
E. Mediating Factors 
In Figure 1, the path designated by the number 3 highlights the mediating 
factors that can affect how the execution of an SAG’s powers will protect the 
public’s health.62  The overall legal environment in which the SAG operates 
can greatly influence his or her ability to bring about meaningful change.  For 
example, researchers have consistently found that effective implementation, 
 
 55. Consumer Protection Summit Panelists, OHIO ATT’Y GEN., (last visited Apr. 18, 2011), 
http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/SpeakOutOhio/Events/Ohio-Consumer-Protection-Summit/ 
Consumer-Protection-Summit-Panelists. 
 56. Letter from G. Steven Rowe et al., Attorney Gen. of Me. et al., to August A. Busch IV, 
President & Chief Exec. Officer, Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc. (May 10, 2007), available at 
http://www.oag.state.md.us/Press/Spykes.pdf. 
 57. David Kesmodel, Anheuser Abandons Spykes Drink, Citing Sales and Rejecting Critics, 
WALL ST. J., May 18, 2007, at B3. 
 58. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorney General § 11 (2007). 
 59. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 7, at 108. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Supra Figure 1. 
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“the process of translating a law into action,”63 is critical to the success of a 
legal initiative.  If an SAG’s efforts to protect the public’s health are not 
implemented, then the SAG’s intended public health measures will likely not 
be enforced.  Because most SAGs are elected, their actions may be swayed by 
the political will of the voters.  This may make an SAG more or less likely to 
vigorously pursue a particular public health issue, depending on its expected 
popularity with the electorate.  Similarly, if an SAG is working with an 
unpopular governor, he or she may take actions to create perceived distance 
from the governor.  Here, again, the SAG may choose to ignore or champion a 
particular public health issue to curry favor with voters.  Furthermore, 
regardless of political motivation, an SAG may, for personal reasons, be 
motivated to address a certain public health issue within his or her state. 
Finally, SAGs may decide to tackle a particular public health issue because 
other SAGs around the country are focusing on a similar issue.  SAGs can 
simultaneously learn from each other to bring about change in their states and 
use their collective presence to stimulate change at the federal level.64  The 
most visible example of this occurred in the 1990s, where SAGs across the 
United States brought lawsuits against the tobacco industry to recoup Medicaid 
costs associated with the treatment of individuals’ smoking-related diseases.65  
These mediating factors are primarily understood through an evidence base 
consisting of legal or political science research and anecdotal reports about an 
SAG’s actions.66 
F. Outputs: Improved Public Health 
As path 4 indicates, the mediating factors discussed in the previous section 
determine the extent to which an SAG’s use of his or her powers brings about 
change that will ultimately improve the public’s health.67  The mediating 
factors along the path designated by the number 3 can both augment and 
hamper changes to the physical environment, the social environment, and 
individuals’ behaviors.68  The results of these changes lead to path 5, improved 
public health.69 
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While the outputs section of the logic model holds the greatest promise for 
understanding the specific ways in which SAGs may improve the public’s 
health, it, unfortunately, lacks a strong evidence base.  As this article will 
explain, there is currently a dearth of empirical evidence that demonstrates the 
association between an SAG’s actions and improved public health.  This 
scarcity of evidence can, in many instances, be attributed to the fact that the 
causal chain connecting an SAG’s actions to improved public health is often 
indirect.  For example, if an SAG brings a lawsuit that leads to restrictions on 
the marketing of cigarettes to young people, it might be extremely difficult to 
construct an evaluation plan that could conclusively demonstrate that the 
lawsuit itself was associated with reduced youth smoking rates.  Several 
intermediate steps (e.g., decreases in youth-oriented cigarette advertising; 
greater enforcement of minimum age laws to purchase cigarettes; concurrent 
but unrelated campaigns designed to lower youth smoking rates) may comprise 
the causal chain that leads from an SAG’s action to improved public health.  
This highlights the need for methodologically rigorous studies that can 
empirically evaluate the connections between SAGs’ activities and improved 
public health. 
III.  PUBLIC HEALTH BENEFITS ACHIEVED BY SAGS 
Because SAGs have diverse powers and tools at their disposal, they can 
take a variety of actions intended to protect and promote the public’s health.  
As path 3 in Figure 1 demonstrates, an SAG’s approach to a public health issue 
is influenced by many factors, including the local legal environment, 
advocates’ activities, the SAG’s own priorities, and the actions of other 
SAGs.70  The following four cases offer a sample of the types of public health 
issues that SAGs have successfully addressed in recent years and, drawing 
upon paths 1 and 2 from the logic model, the different powers they have 
employed. 
A. Tobacco Control Litigation and the Master Settlement Agreement 
Before the mid-1990s, hundreds of people in the United States had sued 
the major tobacco manufacturers for damages stemming from their addiction to 
cigarettes and resulting health problems, with little success.71  During this 
period, the tobacco manufacturers mounted well-financed defense efforts, 
disputing the scientific findings that associated smoking with cancer and other 
diseases and blaming individuals’ lifestyle choices for their illnesses.72  
Because they had extensive financial resources, the tobacco manufacturers 
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“filed every conceivable motion, contested every conceivable issue, took every 
imaginable deposition, and demanded every arguably relevant document.”73  
This strategy allowed the tobacco companies to drain their opponents’ 
emotional and financial reserves. 
On May 23, 1994, Michael Moore, Mississippi’s Attorney General, took 
the first step toward changing the nation’s approach to litigation against the 
tobacco companies.74  Moore filed a lawsuit against the tobacco industry to 
recoup the costs incurred by Mississippi’s Medicaid program for treating 
persons with diseases and conditions related to smoking.75  Unlike previous 
cases, Moore’s lawsuit focused on harms to the state (i.e., Medicaid costs) 
rather than harms to individuals.  He drew on the financial and personnel 
resources of the Mississippi Attorney General’s office, and established 
contingency fee agreements with attorneys outside the SAG’s office who had 
extensive experience with personal injury law.76  These additional attorneys 
brought their own financial resources and familiarity with lawsuits against 
industries engaging in harmful practices.77 
For Moore, the lawsuit involved political risk because he was a Democrat 
in a strongly Republican state.  Kirk Fordice, Mississippi’s Governor, who had 
received re-election support from the tobacco industry,78 attempted to 
extinguish Moore’s lawsuit.79  Fordice’s efforts were unsuccessful and the case 
was allowed to proceed.80  Although the political climates of the other forty-
nine states did not uniformly favor litigation against the tobacco industry, 
Moore and his colleagues knew that their chance of success would be 
“radically augment[ed]” if other SAGs filed similar lawsuits.81  Therefore, 
Moore and others “lobbied their colleagues from the state attorneys general’s 
offices to file suits as well, in an effort to turn their suit into a nationwide legal 
onslaught on the industry.”82  Within a year, Minnesota, Florida, and West 
Virginia had filed similar lawsuits.83  Other states increasingly recognized that 
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this growing collection of lawsuits was sending a strong message to the 
tobacco industry, and by 1997, over forty SAGs had brought related lawsuits.84 
In light of this wave of litigation, the tobacco industry participated in a 
series of secret meetings with tobacco control advocates and several SAGs, 
including Moore, to develop a so-called global settlement.85  During this time, 
the SAGs of four states—Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi, and Texas—settled 
their lawsuits against the tobacco industry.86  The SAGs of the remaining forty-
six states waited to learn about the details of the global settlement.87  In mid-
1997, the terms of the agreement were announced.88  In essence, the global 
settlement “required Congress to grant the tobacco industry limited immunity 
from new lawsuits for past actions and to enact certain public health 
provisions.”89  John McCain then introduced federal legislation to implement 
the settlement.90  Due to a variety of factors, including “lukewarm support 
from the Clinton administration, ambivalence on the part of the public health 
community, and vigorous opposition from the tobacco industry,”91 the McCain 
bill failed. 
Several months later, after returning to settlement negotiations with the 
tobacco industry, the SAGs announced that a new agreement, known as the 
Master Settlement Agreement (MSA), had been reached.92  The MSA required 
the four major tobacco companies to pay $206 billion to the states over the 
course of twenty-five years.93  The states were permitted to use this money 
however they chose, and, in exchange, they would drop pending lawsuits 
against the tobacco industry.94  Among its many provisions, the MSA 
dissolved the industry-supported Tobacco Institute and established the 
American Legacy Foundation, which promoted tobacco control activities.95  In 
addition, the MSA restricted “the advertising, marketing and promotion of 
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cigarettes,”96 which included prohibitions against targeting young people and 
bans on outdoor cigarette advertising.  The MSA did not need federal 
implementing legislation, because, unlike the proposed global settlement, it did 
not involve subjects that required Congressional approval.97 
Once the MSA was officially announced in November 1998, the SAGs of 
the forty-six states that had not previously settled were given seven days to 
decide whether to participate.98  On November 20, 1998, Thurbert E. Baker, 
Georgia’s Attorney General, issued a press release about his decision to 
participate in the MSA that reflected the responses of many SAGs: 
Our analysis of [the MSA] was based in large part on what we could 
realistically hope to achieve under Georgia law through our pending lawsuit, 
and what is being offered in the proposed settlement.  Quite frankly, there are 
many things that this agreement accomplishes, particularly in the public health 
arena, that we could not achieve through our lawsuit in Georgia.99 
Ultimately, all forty-six SAGs decided to participate in the MSA.100  The 
drafting and acceptance of the MSA demonstrate how multiple SAGs, acting in 
concert to take on a particular public health issue or challenge a given industry, 
can use litigation as a catalyst to provoke changes that will protect the public’s 
health. 
B. Rulemaking to Prevent Firearm-Related Injuries and Deaths 
Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that handguns can be designed 
to reduce the likelihood that they will cause injuries or deaths.101  For example, 
loaded chamber indicators are devices that indicate the presence of 
ammunition in a firearm.102  They serve an important purpose, because 
semiautomatic pistols “may retain one ammunition round in the firing chamber 
after the ammunition magazine has been removed . . . .”103  By letting 
individuals know that a round remains in the chamber, loaded chamber 
indicators can prevent accidental shootings in which someone incorrectly 
assumes that a firearm contains no ammunition.  A related device, known as a 
magazine safety, can also prevent accidental shootings because it prevents a 
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gun from firing once its ammunition magazine is removed.104  Magazine 
safeties prevent a gun from firing even if ammunition remains in the gun’s 
chamber.105 
In contrast to other consumer products, the design of handguns is not 
subject to federal regulation.106  As a result, the federal government does not 
require firearms manufacturers to equip their products with safety features like 
loaded chamber indicators and magazine safeties.107  In 1996, Scott 
Harshbarger, Attorney General of Massachusetts, sought to close this 
regulatory gap in his state.108 
Massachusetts law allows the Attorney General to develop rules and 
regulations to address illegal “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.”109  
Relying on this statutory authority,110 Harshbarger became the first SAG in the 
country to promulgate consumer protection regulations requiring firearms to 
contain certain safety features.111  Harshbarger explained that these regulations 
were meant to “stem the tide of handgun violence in the Commonwealth, and 
help make handguns safer for use by law-abiding citizens who purchase them 
to protect themselves, their families and their property.”112 
The regulations, which apply to handguns sold within Massachusetts, ban 
certain “unfair or deceptive practice[s]”113 related to the distribution and design 
of handguns.  Harshbarger’s regulations include provisions to prohibit the sale 
of certain inexpensive, low-quality, compact guns, often referred to as 
“Saturday Night Specials.”114  As the regulations explain, these guns are 
“prone to repeated firing based on a single pull of the trigger, prone to . . . 
explosion . . . during firing with standard ammunition, or prone to accidental 
discharge.”115  In addition, the regulations forbid the sale of handguns without 
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either a loaded chamber indicator or a magazine safety,116 and require 
handguns to be child-proofed in a way that “precludes an average five year old 
child from operating [them].”117 
Almost immediately, several firearms manufacturers and a trade 
association, the American Shooting Sports Council, brought a lawsuit in 
Massachusetts Superior Court to contest the regulations.118  Among their 
allegations, the plaintiffs argued that Harshbarger had “exceeded his authority” 
when promulgating the handgun regulations.119  The Superior Court Judge 
agreed with this claim, and she issued a preliminary injunction to prevent many 
of the new handgun regulations from being enforced.120  Harshbarger appealed 
the case to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.121  It is important to 
note that during this time, the Massachusetts legislature enacted a law that 
mirrored much of the language in Harshbarger’s handgun regulations.122  
Therefore, when Harshbarger’s appeal was decided, in June 1999, the Supreme 
Judicial Court noted that the Attorney General had the power to regulate in the 
area of handguns under both Massachusetts’s consumer protection laws and 
under the state’s newly passed gun control legislation.123  As a result, the 
injunction was vacated, and the regulations were enforced.124 
The actions of the Massachusetts Attorney General paved the way for other 
states to pass similar legislation.  For example, in 1999, California’s legislature 
passed the Aroner-Scott-Hayden Firearms Safety Act.125  As in the 
Massachusetts regulations and subsequent legislation, the California law 
requires a safety device, such as a trigger lock, to be included with any 
handgun sold in the state.126 
C. Investigation into Deceptive Food Labeling Practices 
In October 2008, a coalition led by food and beverage manufacturers, food 
retailers, and scientists announced a new program, known as Smart Choices, 
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which offered front-of-package labeling about an item’s nutritional content.127  
This voluntary program used a set of nutritional criteria, including information 
about fat, sugar, and sodium content, to determine whether an item could be 
deemed a “Smart Choice.”128  Qualifying products could display a front-of-
package logo indicating the Smart Choices seal of approval along with caloric 
information and the number of servings in each package.129  The program’s 
creators stated that Smart Choices was “intended to help consumers make 
smarter food and beverage choices based on their overall nutritional profile.”130 
Shortly after the program was launched in 2009, the Smart Choices logo 
began appearing on “sugary processed cereals such as Froot Loops, Cocoa 
Krispies and Frosted Flakes” as well as ice creams and mayonnaise.131  
Researchers argued that, in essence, “the food industry [had] set its own 
nutritional standards and applied a Smart Choices label to products it 
considered healthy.”132  The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
viewed the Smart Choices program with skepticism, and contacted the 
program’s general manager in August 2009.133  In its letter, the FDA explained 
that it: 
[W]ould be concerned if any [front-of-package] labeling systems used criteria 
that were not stringent enough to protect consumers against misleading 
claims . . . or had the effect of encouraging consumers to choose highly 
processed foods and refined grains instead of fruits, vegetables, and whole 
grains.134 
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While the FDA took no formal action against Smart Choices, it indicated that it 
would conduct research to better understand the effectiveness, particularly in 
terms of public health benefits, of front-of-package labeling.135 
A few months after this exchange, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General 
of Connecticut, became frustrated by the Smart Choices program’s “potentially 
misleading and deceptive labeling of nutritional value . . . .”136  Because of this 
possible deception, Blumenthal initiated an investigation to discern what 
scientific evidence had contributed to the labeling of certain “nutritionally 
suspect foods,” including “sugar-laden cereals,” as Smart Choices.137  
Specifically, Blumenthal sought to determine if the Smart Choices program 
had violated Connecticut’s consumer protection laws, which prohibit 
misleading and deceptive labeling.138  As part of his investigation, Blumenthal 
sent letters to Kellogg’s, General Mills, and PepsiCo, which had voluntarily 
implemented the Smart Choices labeling system, to express his concerns about 
their participation in the program.139  He noted that the investigation, which 
received national media attention, was “ratcheting up pressure for truthful 
answers . . . .”140  In an interview, Blumenthal explained that, although he 
hoped the companies would voluntarily cooperate with his investigation, he 
was willing to use subpoenas, if necessary, to compel production of the 
information he had requested.141 
On October 20, 2009, within days of the initiation of Blumenthal’s 
investigation, Margaret Hamburg, FDA Commissioner, announced that FDA 
would renew its focus on front-of-package labels and take action against 
“labels that are false or that mislead consumers.”142  She explained that FDA 
would draft a regulation that would employ “a single set of science and 
nutrition-based criteria” to govern front-of-package labeling.143  When asked 
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what had motivated this decision, Hamburg provided several reasons, 
including the Smart Choices program.144  That day, Blumenthal issued a press 
release welcoming the FDA’s support of his Smart Choices investigation.145 
The Smart Choices program halted its operations on October 23, 2009, 
stating that, while it would not forbid food and beverage manufacturers to use 
its logo, it would no longer encourage them to do so.146  The program 
acknowledged that it was acting in response to the FDA’s announcement 
regarding its plan to regulate front-of-package labels.147  In addition, Smart 
Choices mentioned that it would cooperate with Blumenthal’s investigation 
and would provide him with “information about the development of the 
program . . . .”148  Shortly after this increase in state and federal attention to the 
Smart Choices program, eight of the largest manufacturers participating in 
Smart Choices suspended their use of the program’s logo.149 
After the Smart Choices program and its participating manufacturers had 
voluntarily ended their allegedly misleading activities, Blumenthal noted that 
the combination of his investigation and the FDA’s regulatory action 
“mark[ed] the beginning of a strong state and federal enforcement partnership 
to stop false food claims . . . .”150  Those with expertise in SAGs’ powers have 
heralded this as a prime example of how an SAG can act, using his or her 
investigatory powers, to protect the public’s health.151 
D. Working with the Federal Government to Address Illegal Marketing of 
Pharmaceuticals 
In the United States, the FDA, under the auspices of the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, “is responsible for protecting the public health by 
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assuring the safety, efficacy, and security of . . . drugs.”152  A drug can only be 
sold legally in the United States after it has received FDA’s approval.153 
In late 1993, the Warner-Lambert Company received approval from the 
FDA to market gabapentin, known commercially as Neurontin, as a drug 
therapy for adults with a particular type of epilepsy.154  After a year of sales, 
Neurontin had met with modest commercial success by pharmaceutical 
standards, with sales revenues of about $100 million.155  Approximately ten 
years later, Neurontin’s sales had jumped to almost $3 billion a year, making it 
one of the most popular drugs in the United States.156  This spike in sales was 
unusual for a drug with limited FDA-approved uses and a relatively static 
patient population. 
By 2000, ninety percent of Neurontin prescriptions were written for off-
label, or non-FDA-approved, uses including bipolar disorder, migraine 
prophylaxis, and the amelioration of certain types of pain.157  Because it is 
legal to prescribe a drug for off-label use, the physicians who prescribed 
Neurontin for non-FDA-approved uses acted within the bounds of the law.158  
It is, however, illegal for pharmaceutical manufacturers to promote a drug for 
off-label uses.159 
In 1996, David Franklin, once a Warner-Lambert employee, brought an 
action against his former employer under the federal False Claims Act.160  
Franklin alleged that 1) Warner-Lambert fraudulently promoted Neurontin for 
off-label uses; and 2) this illegal marketing campaign caused the submission of 
false claims to Medicaid, a program with ties to the federal and state 
governments.161  The Medicaid claims were considered “false claims” because, 
generally speaking, Medicaid will not provide reimbursement for off-label 
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drug use.162  Franklin estimated that, during his time at Warner-Lambert, 
twenty-five percent of Neurontin’s sales were wrongly reimbursed by the 
federal government because they were for off-label uses.163  In addition, 
Franklin alleged that Warner-Lambert went to great lengths to hide its off-label 
marketing activities from the FDA.164 
While the federal government pursued the Franklin litigation, several 
SAGs announced their plans to investigate Warner-Lambert’s off-label 
marketing of Neurontin to determine whether the company had violated state 
consumer protection laws.165  Hardy Myers, Attorney General of Oregon, was 
one of the leaders of this investigation.166 
On May 13, 2004, Warner-Lambert reached a settlement with the federal 
and state governments, “in conjunction with [a guilty plea] to federal criminal 
charges of violating the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act.”167  The settlement 
announcement explained that “Warner-Lambert’s strategic marketing plans, as 
well as other evidence, show that Neurontin was aggressively marketed to treat 
a wide array of ailments for which the drug was not approved . . . .  Warner-
Lambert promoted Neurontin even when scientific studies had shown it was 
not effective.”168  As a consequence of the settlement, Warner-Lambert agreed 
to pay over $430 million to the federal and state governments.169  This 
included payment for criminal fines, restitution to the states’ Medicaid 
programs, and SAGs’ costs incurred while conducting their investigations.170 
The settlement also included provisions for the creation and funding of a 
program to educate consumers and prescribers about the marketing of drugs,171 
and the establishment of an Assurance of Voluntary Compliance, which 
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prohibited Warner-Lambert “from deceptive and misleading pharmaceutical 
marketing practices in the future.”172  Because Oregon’s Attorney General had 
spearheaded the states’ investigation, he was designated as the SAG 
responsible for overseeing the implementation of the consumer and prescriber 
education program.173 
The Warner-Lambert settlement is notable for several reasons, including 
its multi-million dollar figure and its resolution of multiple actions and claims 
made by the federal and state governments.  While several SAGs drew upon 
either their consumer protection or Medicaid fraud resources, Oregon and 
Florida’s SAGs employed a novel approach by using both their consumer 
protection and Medicaid fraud units during the Warner-Lambert investigation 
and settlement negotiations.174  This settlement marked the first time a 
pharmaceutical-marketing case was jointly settled by the federal Department of 
Justice and the National Association of Medicaid Fraud Control Units in 
concert with SAGs’ consumer protection divisions.175 
IV.  SAGS’ EFFECTIVENESS IN PROMOTING THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH 
To date, SAGs’ efforts to improve the public’s health have not been 
extensively studied.  While legal and political science researchers have clearly 
explained what powers are available to SAGs, as summarized in paths 1 and 2 
of the logic model in Figure 1, little evidence exists to demonstrate how, from 
an empirical perspective, these powers have been employed to improve the 
public’s health. 
Brief examples of SAGs’ effectiveness in promoting the public’s health 
have appeared in the scholarly literature through review articles or anecdotal 
reports.176  Some SAGs, or their close colleagues, have provided an insider’s 
view of successful public health endeavors by publishing first-hand accounts 
of their work.  In 1997, Craig R. Mayton, an assistant Attorney General in 
Ohio, wrote an article for Health Affairs detailing his approach, along with 
Ohio’s Attorney General, Betty D. Montgomery, to the conversion of non-
profit health care institutions into for-profit entities.177  Mayton explained that, 
as an assistant SAG, he sought to ensure that, as part of the conversion process, 
the “full value of the [hospital’s] non-profit assets [were] preserved for the 
community.”178  Specifically, his office worked to determine whether a non-
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profit hospital’s charitable assets were being purchased for “full and fair value” 
by a for-profit entity and whether the proceeds from this purchase would be 
“applied to proper charitable purposes,” such as the creation of a charitable 
foundation to address health care needs in the affected community.179  Mayton 
discussed several ways in which Ohio’s Attorney General approached this 
issue, including litigation and support of legislation to clarify the conversion 
process and the conveyance of a non-profit hospital’s charitable assets.180 
Review articles in the legal literature have provided overviews of SAGs’ 
successful public health efforts.  For example, in a 2002 article for the 
Oklahoma City University Law Review, W.A. Drew Edmondson, former 
Attorney General of Oklahoma, reviewed SAGs’ attempts to improve end-of-
life care.181  He explained that, during his time as President of the National 
Association of Attorneys General, he developed and promoted an initiative 
“focused on the current and emerging role of Attorneys General in protection 
of consumers of health care near the end of [their] lives.”182  To illustrate the 
scope of this initiative, he mentioned two SAGs.183  First, Edmondson 
discussed the “positive policy environment” for end-of-life issues established 
by Maryland Attorney General Joseph Curran, Jr.184  He noted that Curran 
“maintain[ed] proper law enforcement focus, [did] not overburden good 
practitioners, and bolster[ed] advocates for better pain management.”185  
Edmondson then turned to the efforts of Rhode Island Attorney General 
Sheldon Whitehouse, which included the co-sponsorship of conferences about 
end-of-life issues with multiple stakeholders, the establishment of a task force 
to assess end-of-life care recommendations, and the creation of a medical-legal 
steering committee charged with improving Rhode Island’s end-of-life care 
laws.186 
Some researchers have used qualitative research methodologies, such as 
the case study approach, to better understand how SAGs can contribute to the 
development of health policy.  For example, in 1984, Ronald C. Lippincott 
conducted a case study to explore the role of SAGs in bringing antitrust 
lawsuits, with a focus on lawsuits targeting health care institutions that had 
engaged in practices to limit competition.187  The case study, which was 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 94–95. 
 181. See W. A. Drew Edmondson, Improving End-of-Life Care: The Role of Attorneys 
General, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 911 (2002). 
 182. Id. at 911–12. 
 183. Id. at 914–15. 
 184. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 185. Id. at 914. 
 186. Id. at 915. 
 187. Ronald C. Lippincott, Redressing the Imbalanced Political Market for Health Policy: A 
Role for the State Attorney General?, 9 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 389 (1984). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
292 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXX:267 
grounded in political science theory, was situated in Ohio, because during the 
1970s, William J. Brown, Ohio’s Attorney General, had filed seven antitrust 
lawsuits against health care institutions, making the state “a leader in this 
area.”188  Lippincott found that, as an SAG, Brown’s “ultimate interest was 
electoral survival, [and his] strategy was to model the Attorney General’s 
Office on a public interest law firm which advocated the consumer interests of 
Ohio’s citizens.  Health care was perceived as a salient consumer issue . . . .”189 
In addition, Brown and his political advisors had determined that “although 
[the antitrust] actions might jeopardize future political support from the health 
industry, such losses were perceived minimal . . . .  [H]ealth providers were not 
his natural constituency.”190  Given the beneficial outcomes of Brown’s 
antitrust enforcement activities for consumers, Lippincott concluded that 
antitrust law provided one tool that an SAG could successfully draw upon to 
protect the public’s health.191  Lippincott underscored, however, that Brown’s 
motivation to enter the health policy arena was driven in large part by political 
considerations related to his chances of reelection.192 
Finally, statistical modeling has been employed to study how SAGs have 
worked together to tackle public health issues, particularly in the context of 
tobacco litigation.  In 2003, Thomas A. Schmeling published a study in which 
he used collective action theory to guide the creation of statistical models that 
tested hypotheses about SAGs’ cooperation while litigating against the tobacco 
industry.193  Schmeling suggested that the litigation that ultimately led to the 
Master Settlement Agreement with the major tobacco companies in 1998 can 
“be best understood not as forty-two SAGs independently trying to win at trial 
against the tobacco companies, but as an effort to bring enough resources to 
bear to force the companies to settle to avoid the cost and uncertainty of 
litigation.”194 
After conducting an event-history analysis, Schemling concluded that 
SAGs’ apparent coordination in suing the tobacco industry between 1994 and 
1998 “emerged from a process of interdependent decision-making, in which 
the SAGs influenced each other as each observed and reacted to the decisions 
of the rest.”195  In addition, Schemling found that the heterogeneity of SAGs’ 
political environments contributed to cooperation among SAGs affiliated with 
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different political parties.196  Specifically, he suggested that the many lawsuits 
initiated by Democratic SAGs likely served as a motivator for Republican 
SAGs, who, for political reasons, may have been less motivated to sue the 
tobacco industry.197  This, in turn, led to actual and perceived bipartisan 
cooperation, which may have stimulated other SAGs to participate in the 
lawsuits.198 
V.  SAGS’ CURRENT AND FUTURE ABILITY TO IMPROVE THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH 
SAGs have repeatedly used their powers, in both traditional and novel 
ways, to improve the public’s health.  To better understand SAGs’ current and 
future ability to improve the public’s health, several types of information are 
needed.  First, the research base that empirically demonstrates the association 
between SAGs’ efforts and improved public health must be expanded.  This 
requires two evaluative approaches. 
The first should involve studies that assess the utility of the varied powers 
available to SAGs.  There is a compelling need for a state-by-state survey of 
SAGs’ existing powers, with a standardized ranking system to indicate the 
strength of different powers to improve the public’s health.  Using a mixed 
methods approach, this type of national mapping study could then be 
supplemented with a series of case studies to better understand how, in states 
with stronger powers, SAGs have acted to protect the public’s health.  
Additional types of quantitative or qualitative work could help to explain how 
states with stronger SAG powers have fared relative to states with weaker SAG 
powers for specific public health problems (e.g., do SAGs with stronger 
powers draw on them more frequently to tackle public health issues than SAGs 
in states with weaker powers; are certain powers deployed in a uniform way 
across states to address a particular public health problem?).  The second 
evaluative approach would involve the selection of a specific public health 
policy promoted by an SAG and an assessment of the policy’s effectiveness, 
given the SAG’s intended public health goals.  These complementary 
approaches would provide information about SAGs’ varied powers and about 
SAGs’ approaches to particular public health issues. 
The second way to develop a better understanding of SAGs’ ability to 
improve the public’s health involves the examination of SAGs’ perceived 
public health victories and failures.  This article provides examples of SAGs’ 
perceived victories in the areas of tobacco control, firearms regulation, food 
policy, and off-label marketing of drugs.  Much can also be learned from 
examining instances in which an SAG has tried, unsuccessfully, to tackle a 
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particular public health issue.  Although the public health community may 
initially perceive these instances as failures, they can provide important insight 
for SAGs as they strategize and plan their future public health endeavors. 
One widely publicized, and unsuccessful, public health effort by an SAG 
began in 1999 when Sheldon Whitehouse, Rhode Island’s Attorney General, 
brought a lawsuit against lead pigment manufacturers and a trade 
association.199  On behalf of the state of Rhode Island, Whitehouse argued that 
the defendants were responsible for creating a public nuisance, due to the 
health hazards associated with exposure to residential paint that contained 
lead.200  In 2006, a jury found the defendants guilty, making this case “the first 
time in the United States that a trial resulted in a verdict that imposed liability 
on lead pigment manufacturers for creating a public nuisance.”201  Initially, this 
seemed to introduce a novel legal theory that SAGs could draw upon to protect 
the public’s health, particularly because the defendants would have been 
required “to pay billions of dollars to clean up contaminated homes.”202  
However, in 2008, following an appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
overturned the jury’s verdict, after concluding that the SAG’s lawsuit had not 
met each element required for a successful claim of public nuisance.203 
While this lawsuit did not benefit the public’s health, it provided useful 
lessons to SAGs in other states who were contemplating, or in the midst of, 
similar lawsuits.204  Rhode Island’s Supreme Court noted that public nuisance 
remained “a legally viable cause of action,”205 meaning that it could one day be 
effectively applied to a different area of public health, in which the facts of the 
case more favorably met the public nuisance criteria. 
This finding proved helpful to other SAGs.  For example, in 2009, 
Indiana’s Attorney General brought a lawsuit against two landlords who, he 
alleged, had ignored warnings from their county health department to engage 
in lead paint abatement.206  This lawsuit offered a new twist on a public 
nuisance theory of liability, since it was brought to force landlords to comply 
with their duties to their tenants.207  If successful, this case could provide other 
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SAGs with a promising model for the use of public nuisance theory in 
litigation related to lead paint and other public health issues. 
When SAGs contemplate their approach to a public health issue, they must 
decide which of their powers to employ.  As the Rhode Island case 
demonstrates, although a power like litigation may seem promising, it may not 
ultimately be successful.  In light of this realization, SAGs are increasingly 
balancing the threat or use of litigation against the exercise of other powers, 
such as rule-making, or the employment of their bully pulpit.  With the 
promulgation of a rule or regulation, an SAG can comprehensively address a 
public health issue and possibly avoid engaging in several rounds of litigation 
with multiple defendants.  On the other hand, legal challenges may arise to an 
SAG’s authority to promulgate a particular regulation, as occurred in the case 
of Massachusetts Attorney General Scott Harshbarger and his gun control 
regulations.208  While Harshbarger successfully defended his authority to 
develop and enforce these regulations, the lawsuit exemplifies the types of 
legal hurdles that an SAG may face when engaging in rule-making.209 
Some SAGs have, in recent years, made greater use of their bully pulpit to 
protect the public’s health.  After the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement with 
the tobacco industry, Joseph Curran, Maryland’s Attorney General, remained 
concerned that, despite the MSA’s strict prohibitions of tobacco companies’ 
efforts to place their products in the media, smoking and tobacco products, 
including brand names, continued to be featured in movies.210  Curran, along 
with twenty-seven other SAGs, wrote a letter in 2003 to Jack Valenti, 
President of the Motion Picture Association of America, asking the film 
industry to “reduc[e] the depiction of smoking in movies.”211  This led to a 
series of conversations involving SAGs, film industry executives, and tobacco 
control researchers.  One result of this dialog was a pledge from the Directors 
Guild of America to “create antismoking public service announcements” that 
could be played in movie theaters before films that featured smoking.212  
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Curran and his colleagues did not use any of their formal powers as SAGs to 
accomplish this.  Instead, they used the clout of their collective request to sway 
the movie industry. 
To brainstorm approaches to urgent public health issues, SAGs can 
capitalize on the cachet of their office and invite public health and other 
experts to convene.  For example, in February 2010, William Sorrell, 
Vermont’s Attorney General, held a summit as part of “a new initiative to 
identify and develop actions to reduce obesity in Vermont.”213  This meeting 
included experts in food and obesity policy, nutrition, and state and federal 
physical activity programs.214  As a result of the summit, working groups were 
formed to focus on diverse aspects of obesity control efforts.215  Going 
forward, Sorrell will work with these groups to determine the best ways in 
which his office can address obesity. 
By recognizing mutually beneficial opportunities, SAGs can leverage their 
own efforts to bring about even greater public health protections.  These 
opportunities may arise in a variety of contexts.  For instance, SAGs can work 
with their state legislatures to promulgate regulations that complement recently 
passed legislation.  If SAGs work with their SAG colleagues in other states to 
take on a particular public health issue, they can use their collective power to 
impact policy-making at the federal level.  While the Master Settlement 
Agreement, which involved forty-six SAGs, offers the most well-known 
example of this type of collaboration,216 smaller groups of SAGs can wield 
significant influence on the federal government’s approach to a public health 
issue, particularly if they can provide examples of their own state’s successful 
efforts.  Finally, borrowing from the concepts behind social mobilization 
theory,217 SAGs can respond to the demands of existing grassroots coalitions, 
such as the environmental protection movement, with the understanding that 
these groups are likely to provide strong support for the development and 
implementation of policies that correspond to their agendas. 
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VI.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING SAGS’ ABILITY TO IMPROVE THE 
PUBLIC’S HEALTH 
Due to their wide-ranging powers, connections to multiple government 
actors, and ability to act in concert, SAGs are uniquely positioned to protect 
and promote the public’s health.  By developing a better understanding of 
SAGs’ extensive abilities, public health professionals can take steps to 
contribute to SAGs’ public health efforts.  The creation of a more synergistic 
relationship between SAGs and the public health community would foster 
mutually beneficial goals, such as the translation of research into policy. 
By sharing their research with SAGs and summarizing the relevant work of 
other researchers, public health professionals can provide an evidence base that 
will drive SAGs to take action.  For example, on September 21, 2009, five 
researchers with expertise in substance abuse sent a letter to the three SAG co-
chairs of the NAAG Youth Access to Alcohol Committee “in response to the 
concerns raised by State law enforcement officials regarding the safety of 
caffeinated alcoholic beverages.”218  After providing an evidence-based 
presentation of the problem and summarizing the empirical research base, the 
researchers explained that: 
[T]here is no general consensus among health professionals and the scientific 
research community that the use of caffeine in alcoholic beverages has been 
demonstrated to be safe.  On the contrary, the consumption of caffeinated 
alcoholic beverages has been associated with increased risk of serious injury to 
oneself and to others, as the result of driving while intoxicated, sexual assault, 
and other dangerous behaviors.219 
The letter was accompanied by a list of references that included the studies the 
researchers had mentioned, as well as relevant literature reviews and citations 
for additional empirical work that had examined the health effects associated 
with caffeinated alcoholic drinks.220  A week later, the three SAG co-chairs 
and fifteen additional SAGs sent a letter, which included the researchers’ 
original letter as an attachment, to the Commissioner of the FDA to express 
concern about the rise of caffeinated alcoholic beverages.221  The SAGs’ letter 
repeatedly referenced the substance abuse researchers’ findings, noting that 
“experts in the field agree that the use of caffeine added to alcohol poses a 
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significant public health threat . . . .”222  Several weeks later, the FDA launched 
an investigation into the safety and health issues associated with caffeinated 
alcoholic beverages.223  In a press release, the FDA noted that eighteen SAGs 
had contacted the agency regarding concerns about caffeinated alcoholic 
beverages.224  In November 2010, the FDA determined that caffeine was “an 
unsafe food additive” when combined with alcoholic beverages.225  The four 
beverage makers that FDA targeted have all ceased the production and 
shipment of caffeinated alcoholic beverages.226 
As this example demonstrates, SAGs use research to guide and strengthen 
their efforts to protect the public’s health.  Public health professionals can 
share their findings by contacting SAGs directly or by seeking out 
opportunities to present at NAAG events.  NAAG hosts three formal meetings 
a year for all SAGs, which are supplemented by additional workshops and 
smaller gatherings.227  For those whose research involves public health law and 
policy, NAAG meetings present a chance to educate SAGs about innovative 
ways to protect the public’s health, such as using existing consumer protection 
powers to regulate in previously ignored areas. 
To ensure a bi-directional exchange of information, public health 
professionals should invite SAGs to share their experiences through conference 
presentations or brief journal articles.  By communicating directly with the 
public health community, SAGs can educate public health professionals about 
areas in need of an evidence base.  This, in turn, can stimulate new public 
health research, which can strengthen SAGs’ public health efforts. 
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By engaging in research to better understand and analyze SAGs’ public 
health successes and failures, public health professionals can develop 
knowledge to bolster SAGs’ future efforts.  The logic model in Figure 1 
provides a useful organizational tool for identifying the types of studies that 
should be conducted.228  Paths 1 and 2 denote the different types of powers that 
SAGs can use to improve the public’s health (e.g., litigation and law 
enforcement; investigative activities; law and policy reform).  Although the 
research base is far from exhaustive, legal and political science scholars have 
studied these powers and their execution.  Moreover, little empirical work has 
been conducted to better understand the mediating factors that follow Path 3.229  
A handful of studies have addressed mediating factors,230 such as an SAG’s 
concerns about reelection or how the actions of SAGs throughout the nation 
can influence other SAGs. 
Future research about the factors that mediate SAGs’ efforts to improve the 
public’s health might involve case studies.  Because SAGs’ powers vary 
among the states, and each SAG operates in a unique political climate, case 
studies can offer important insights into how a particular SAG approached a 
given public health issue.  Multiple case studies can be conducted to capitalize 
on findings that may be revealed during so-called natural experiments.  These 
experiments may arise when SAGs use different powers to address the same 
public health issue (e.g., regulation versus litigation to combat lead paint). 
Research devoted to studying Paths 4 and 5231—namely the outputs that 
constitute improved public health in light of SAGs’ actions—is largely lacking.  
A variety of study designs could be employed to fill this gap.  For example, 
researchers can employ mapping studies to understand how SAGs throughout 
the United States have used their powers to take on a specific public health 
issue.  These types of studies can also assess the extent to which SAGs’ 
interventions are being enforced.  In addition, statistical modeling can be used 
to empirically assess the effects of SAGs’ efforts on public health outcomes.  
Finally, for areas in which the public health impacts of an SAG’s actions are 
unclear, researchers can use health impact assessments to help SAGs 
appreciate the extent to which their actions will help or harm the public’s 
health. 
 
 228. Supra Figure 1. 
 229. Supra Figure 1. 
 230. These include Lippincott’s theoretically grounded case study that explores the role of 
SAGs in bringing antitrust lawsuits and Schmeling’s event history analysis of SAGs’ involvement 
in the lawsuits that led to the Master Settlement Agreement.  See supra notes 187–198 and 
accompanying text. 
 231. Supra Figure 1. 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
SAGs have tremendous potential to protect and promote the public’s 
health.  Although they have a broad grant of authority and a wide range of 
powers to draw upon, SAGs’ abilities are not well understood by public health 
professionals.  Yet, through both formal and informal powers, SAGs have 
repeatedly brought innovative approaches to well-entrenched public health 
issues.  Acting alone, an SAG can influence a public health issue in his or her 
own state, but SAGs can also act together to bring about change at the federal 
level.  By learning more about SAGs’ public health successes and failures, 
public health professionals can develop a better understanding of how to 
collaborate, through research or practice efforts, with these promising partners. 
 
